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FROM JUDICIAL SOLUTIONS TO POLITICAL SOLUTIONS:




Although the ethicaP and economic aspects2 of insider trading
regulation have been discussed at length, only recently have com-
mentators begun to examine the political components of insider
trading regulation.3 This virtual neglect of the political side of the
story is particularly curious in light of the fact that regulation of
insiders' trading practices recently has become a highly politicized
issue, resulting in numerous bills· and hearingsll in Congress.
c Copyright 1988 by Jonathan R. Macey.
* Professor of Law, Cornell University. A.B. 1977, Harvard University; J.D. 1982, Yale
Law School.
1. Hetherington, Insider Trading and the Logic of the Low, 1967 WIS. 1.. REv. 720;
Schotland, Unsafe at Any Price: A Reply to Manne, Insider Trading and the Stock Market,
53 VA. L. REV. 1425 (1967): see also Scott, Insider Trading: Rule 10b-5, Disclosure and
Corporate Privacy, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 801, 805-09 (1980) (discussing fairness rationale under-
lying rule 10b-5).
2. The important economic work on insider trading begins with Dean Henry Manne's
seminal Insider Trading and the Stock Market (1966). See also CarlUln & Fischel, The
Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN. 1.. REv. 857 (1983): Haddock & Macey, A Coasian
Model of Insider Trading, 80 Nw. UL. REv. 1449 (1986).
3. See Haddock & Macey, Controlling Insider Trading in Europe and America: The
Economics of the Politics, in LAW & ECONOr.UCS & THE EcONOWCS OF LEGAL REGULAnoN
149 (J.M. Graf von der Schulenburg & G. Skogh eds. 1986) [hereinafter Haddock & Macey,
Controlling Insider Trading]; Haddock & Macey, Regulation on Demand: A Private Inter-
est Model, With an Application to Insider Trading Regulation, 30 J. 1.. & EcoN. 311 (1987)
[hereinafter Haddock & Macey, Regulation on Demand].
4. The following bills were introduced before Congress in 1987:
(1) S. 230, l00th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987), introduced by SenaUlr D'Amato on January 6,
1987, entails proposed legislation that, inter alia, provides a definition of insider trading and
holds companies civilly liable for money damages if the companies knew or should have
known that their employees were engaging in illegal insider trading. For comment, see
D'Amato Proposes Insider Trading Bill with Definition of Insider Trading, 19 Sec. Reg. &
L. Rep. (BNA) 86 (Jan. 16, 1987); Boesky, Other Insider Issues, Debated at Annual Securi-
ties Institute, 19 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 171 (Jan. 30, 1987).
355
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At present, a battle for the right to regulate insider trading is
being fought among Congress, the regulators at the Securities and
(2) S. 231, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987), also introduced by Senator D'Amato, is an
alternative to S. 230 and provides a broader approach to the insider trading problem. For
comment, see D'Amato Proposes Insider Trading Bill with Definition of Insider Trading,
supra.
(3) S. 657, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONGo REc. S2821 (daily ed. Mar. 6, 1987), intro-
duced by Senator Metzenbaum on March 6, 1987, mandates treble damages for insider
trading and provides a substantial increase to the civil liability penalties for insider trading
(i.e., up to $500,000 and up to 5 years in prison, or both). For comment, see Metzenbaum to
Propose Mandating Treble Damages for Insider Trading, 19 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 330
(Mar. 6, 1987).
(4) H.R. 251, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987), reintroduced by Representative Neal Smith
(D-Iowa) on January 6, 1987, amends the Commodity Exchange Act, ch. 545, KK 1-13, 49
Stat. 1491 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.), to bar insider trading in
the futures industry and also defines "insider." For comment, see Iowa Representative
Reintroduces Bill Barring Insider Trading in Futures Industry, 19 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep.
(BNA) 139 (Jan. 23, 1987).
(5) H.R. 1238, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987), introduced by Representative John Cony-
ers (D-Mich.), Chairman of the House Judiciary Criminal Justice Subcommittee, on
February 25, 1987, mandates a 10-year jail sentence for criminal insider trading. For com-
ment, see House Bill To Increase Jail Term for Insider Trading Wins Mixed Reviews, 19
Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1091 (July 24, 1987).
(6) H.R. 2494, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONGo REc. H3908 (daily ed. May 21, 1987),
introduced by Representative Richard Boucher (D-Va.) on May 21, 1987, permits the SEC
to pay rewards for information leading to the detection and prosecution of unlawful insider
trading and market manipulation. For comment, see Boucher Bill Would Let the SEC Use
Paid Informants To Fight Insider Trading, 19 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 782 (May 29,
1987).
(7) S. 1323, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONGo REC. S7601 (daily ed. June 4, 1987)
(Tender Offer Disclosure and Fairness Act of 1987), introduced by Senator Riegle, along
with Senator Proxmire, on June 4, 1987, reforms the regulation of tender offer. The bill
increases the maximum imprisonment for insider trading from 5 years to 10 years and the
maximum fine from $100,000 to $1 million. It also requires a minimum sentence of 1 year
for perjury or obstruction of justice in connection with an insider trading investigation. See
Definition of Insider Trading (Part I): Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the
Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (June 17
& 19, 1987) (statement of Senator Donald W. Riegle) [hereinafter June Senate Hearings].
In addition to the above introduced bills, the following special interest groups are also
active in this area of reform: (1) The Securities Industry Association (SIA) and their ad hoc
group of industry officials formed to explore insider trading issues, see SIA Forms Ad Hoc
Group To Study Insider Trading Issues, 19 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 132 (Jan. 23, 1987),
SIA Urges Insider Trading Definition, Seeks More Surveillance by SRO's, Firms, 19 Sec.
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 438 (Mar. 27, 1987); (2) the American Bar Association (ABA), see
ABA Members Call for Changes in Short Swing Profit, Reporting Rules, 19 Sec. Reg. & L.
Rep. (BNA) 544 (Apr. 17, 1987); (3) the North American Securities Administrators Associa-
tion (NASAA), see Speakers Offer Variety of Solutions for Insider Trading at NASAA
Meeting, 19 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 555 (Apr. 17, 1987); and (4) the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC), see June Senate Hearings, supra, at 109-41 (testimony of
Charles C. Cox, Acting Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission).
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Exchange Commission ("SEC"), and the federal judiciary. Each or-
ganization has an institutional and, in some cases, political interest
in regulating the trading practices of insiders, and their proposed
regulations reflect these interests.
Not surprisingly, the federal judiciary, insulated from political
pressures by the relative independence afforded it by article ill of
the Constitution, has promulgated the most sensible rules on in-
sider trading.6 Political dissatisfaction with this judicial
intervention among powerful political constituencies has led Con-
gress and the SEC to attempt to abrogate the rules developed by
the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts over the last sev-
eral years.
Focusing on the politically controversial aspects of insider
trading, this Article initially examines the political implications of
the rules on this subject that were generated by the Supreme
Court's decisions in Chiarella v. United States? and Dirks v. SECs
and clarified in a series of lower court decisions.9 Both Chiarella
and Dirks brought clarity and coherence to the law of insider trad-
ing, a much-needed shift from its earlier state of confusion. These
decisions also represented major defeats to the SEC's concerted at-
tempts to manipulate the insider trading rules to enhance its
bureaucratic powers.
I will explain why these holdings dissatisfied powerful. special
interest constituencies of Congress and the SEC. I believe that this
discontent with the Supreme Court's rulings led the SEC to pro-
5. The following hearings have been held: (1) Definition of Insider Trading (Part II):
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing,
and Urban Affairs, lOOth Cong., 1st Sess. (Aug. 7, 1987); (2) June Senate Hearings, supra
note 4; (3) Improper Activities in the Securities Industry: Hearing Before the Senate
Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong., 1st Seas. (Apr. 22, 1987); (4)
Oversight of the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Securities Industry: Hear-
ing Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (Feb. 24, 1987); (5) Insider Trading: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, and Finance of the House
Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 99th Cong., 2d Seas. (June 18 & July 23, 1986).
An additional hearing was conducted before the Securities Subcommittee on December
15, 1987. However, due to the backlog at the United States Government Printing Office, the
December hearing was unavailable at the time of this writing.
6. See Macey, From Fairness to Contract: The New Direction of the Rules Against
Insider Trading, 13 HOFSTRA L. REv. 9, 12 (1984).
7. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
8. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
9. See infra text accompanying notes 21-22.
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mulgate the recently proposed compromise statute, which purports
to define the crime of insider trading for the first time.10
Additionally, I will argue that the insider trading laws cur-
rently being considered reflect only the narrow, "special" interests
of these constituencies, rather than the public's interest in protect-
ing the "fairness, efficiency and integrity of the Nation's securities
markets."ll In a previous article, I traced the evolution of the
judge-made law of insider trading from the enactment of SEC rule
10b-512 to the Supreme Court's decisions in Chiarella and Dirks.13
I argued that the courts gradually have shifted from vague, inco-
herent "fairness" principles within insider trading law to precise,
intellectually defensible justifications based on contract law and on
contractarian ideas about the modern publicly held corporation.
Since I completed that article, the locus of lawmaking on the sub-
ject of insider trading has moved from the federal courts to
Congress. The consequence has been the triumph of politics over
principle.
I. THE RAMIFICATIONS OF Chiarella AND Dirks
Prior to the Reagan Administration, elected officials deferred
the regulation of insider trading to the SEC and the federal courts.
During the 1980s, the Supreme Court, philosophically opposed to
the SEC's position on insider trading, rejected the notion that
those possessing material nonpublic corporate information owe a
general duty to the marketplace that requires them to disclose that
information. In its place, the Supreme Court established a theory
of insider trading liability defined by property law. The Court's
shift in focus was profoundly threatening to the SEC and led to
pleas for congressional action to alter the way in which insider
trading practices are regulated.
10. See Securities and Exchange Commission Proposed Insider Trading Bill (Nov. 18,
1987) [hereinafter SEC Proposed Bill], reprinted in SEC Compromise Proposal on Insider
Trading Legislation; Accompanying Letter, and Analysis by Ad Hoc Legislation Commit-
tee, 19 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1817 (Nov. 27, 1987).
11. See SEC Proposed Bill, supra note 10, sec. 2, § 16A(a)(1).
12. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1987).
13. Macey, supra note 6, at 13-39.
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A. The Supreme Court's Insider Trading Rules
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Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Chiarella, the law of
insider trading was a morass.If The law not only was devoid of
clarity, but also lacked a unifying theory of liability upon which
enforcement could be based. The SEC professed a rule that came
perilously close to penalizing any trader who dared to consummate
a securities transaction of any kind on the basis of an informa-
tional advantage over his trading partner. If fully implemented,
this theory would have brought the capital markets to ruin.
In deciding Chiarella, the Supreme Court temporarily rescued
the financial marketplace. The defendant in the case, Vincent
Chiarella, was accused in criminal court of trading stock on the
basis of information acquired in the course of his employment at
Pandick Press, a financial printer. Mr. Chiarella had deduced the
identity of companies that were about to become targets of public
tender offers by decoding the disclosure documents that he was
helping to prepare. Significantly, while making it clear that
Chiarella could be found guilty under these facts, Justice Powell,
writing for the Court, rejected the SEC's contention that all trad-
ers owe a general duty of disclosure to all participants in market
transactions, regardless of how the traders have obtained the infor-
mation upon which they are trading.lG
By squarely rejecting the possibility, left open by the Second
Circuit's flawed (but highly influential) opinion in SEC v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur CO.,16 that the law required total equality of infor-
mation among traders,17 the Supreme Court ushered in a new era
of certainty and rationality in the realm of insider trading regula-
tion. The Court not only dismissed the idea that the law should
attempt to achieve a generalized parity of information among trad-
ers, but also refused to accept the additional theory in Texas Gulf
Sulphur that a purchaser or seller of stock automatically acquires
14. See id. at 13-24 (describing the state of the insider trading law at the time of the
Chiarella decision).
15. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 235 (1980).
16. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en bane), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
17. See Macey, supra note 6, at 26.
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a duty to disclose whenever he enters into a transaction on an or-
ganized stock exchange.18
Reception of either theory of liability would have had disas-
trous consequences on the financial marketplace. The capital
markets are driven by the quest for information. Without an op-
portunity to profit from an informational advantage, traders would
have no incentive to expend the resources necessary to obtain and
assimilate firm-specific information about companies. Without
such information, the capital markets would behave in an irra-
tional manner, unable to serve as an adequate guide for the
allocation of society's investment resources. Thus, by rejecting
these earlier theories of liability, the Supreme Court performed an
important service to the capital markets and the national economy.
In place of the dangerous incoherence in the law that preceded
Chiarella, the Court offered a new theory, based on notions of
property rights, to define the trading activities of insiders. That is,
the Court clarified the definition of insider trading. Specifically,
the Court held that a specific contractual relationship, fiduciary in
nature, is a necessary prerequisite to liability under the SEC's no-
torious rule lOb-5.19
In Chiarella the Court clearly established that there is no obli-
gation to disclose "where the person who has traded on the inside
information was not the corporation's agent[,] ... was not a fiduci-
ary, was not a person in whom the sellers had placed their trust
and confidence."2o Moreover, because Chiarella had been crimi-
nally prosecuted and the new "fiduciary duty" theory of liability
had not been articulated to the jury, the Court ruled that
Chiarella's conviction could not be upheld. In cases decided subse-
quent to Chiarella, particularly United States v. Newman21 and
SEC v. Materia,22 however, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
expressly held that future fact patterns similar to the one that
gave rise to Chiarella's prosecution will support a criminal prosecu-
tion under rule lOb-5. In both Newman and Materia, investment
18. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 232-33 (finding that Chiarella owed no duty to his trading
partners to disclose or refrain from trading because he "dealt with the sellers through only
impersonal market transactions").
19. Id. at 233.
20. [d.
21. 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983).
22. 745 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1053 (1985).
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bankers and financial printers held positions of trust and confi-
dence in connection with the roles they played on behalf of bidders
seeking control of publicly traded corporations. The individuals
betrayed those confidential relationships by trading for their own
accounts on the information they acquired. The trading occurred
at the expense of the firms that initiated the relevant control con-
tests and gave rise to a cause of action under rule lOb-5.
Subsequently, the Supreme Court, in Dirks v. SEC,23 further
clarified insider trading law by formulating a rule to handle the
problem of tippee liability.24 In that case, the defendant, Raymond
Dirks, was a financial analyst who had acquired confidential infor-
mation about Equity Funding, a large insurance firm, from former
officers and directors of that company. The acquired information
revealed that the assets of Equity Funding were vastly overstated
as a result of internal fraud of epic proportions. Dirks, after verify-
ing the tips at great personal peril and expense, advised several of
his clients to liquidate their holdings in Equity Funding. Several of
his clients took his advice and thereby avoided windfall losses
when the fraud ultimately was exposed.
Confirming the old adage that no good deed goes unpunished
(at least by the SEC), the SEC pursued Dirks to the full extent of
the law. In absolving Dirks of liability, the Supreme Court handed
the SEC its second straight major defeat in insider trading litiga-
tion. In doing so the Court developed what is essentially a three-
part test for determining tippee liability. First, for a tippee to be
liable, the person from whom he has acquired his information (the
tipper) himself must have breached a fiduciary duty of some
kind.25 Second, tippees are liable only if they inherit the fiduciary
duty of their tipper. Tippees inherit such a duty only in cases in
which "they knew or should have known that the tipper has
breached" a fiduciary duty in passing along the information.26 Fi-
nally, a tippee is liable for trading on such information only where
the tipper passes along the information in order to receive a "di-
23. 463 u.s. 646 (1983).
24. A "tippee," of course, is someone who acquires material nonpublic information
from somebody who enjoys a fiduciary relationship with the firm to which such information
pertains.
25. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 663.
26. Id.
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rect or indirect personal benefit . . . such as a pecuniary gain or
reputational benefit that will translate into future earnings."27
Although significant problems exist with the test devised by
the Court in Dirks,28 the fact remains that in that case the Court
reaffirmed the basic principle of Chiarella that the SEC's theory of
liability in insider trading cases will not withstand judicial scrutiny
simply because the theory is "rooted in the idea that the antifraud
provisions [of the securities laws] require equal information among
all traders."29
The Court based its affirmance of Chiarella on economic prin-
ciples that evinced a solid respect for property rights. Specifically,
the Court recognized the value to the capital markets of encourag-
ing the activities of financial analysts such as Dirks and declined to
permit the SEC to regulate those vital activities in the ways in
which they were attempting to do SO.30 As the Court noted:
Imposing a duty to disclose or abstain solely because a person
knowingly receives material nonpublic information from an insider
and trades on it could have an inhibiting influence on the role of
market analysts, which the SEC itself recognizes is necessary to the
preservation of a healthy market.... The analyst's judgment ... is
made available [in various ways] to clients of [the analyst's] firm. It
is the nature of this type of information, and indeed of the markets
themselves, that such information cannot be made simultaneously
available to all of the corporation's stockholders or the public
generally.31
B. The Political Fallout from Chiarella and Dirks
One lesson can be drawn from the above analysis that tran-
scends all others. It is that the rules regarding insider trading have
become more, rather than less, coherent over time.32 The nature of
the constraints on insiders' trading activities that were promul-
27. [d.
28. See Macey, supra note 6, at 37-39.
29. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 657.
30. [d. at 658-59.
31. [d.
32. Further support for the argument that insider trading law has become more,
rather than less, clear over time lies in the fact that when Congress promulgated the Insider
Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§
78c, 780, 78t, 78u & 78ft' (Supp. II 1984», which increased the penalties for violations of the
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gated by the Supreme Court in Dirks and Chiarella were as
concise, coherent, and economically rational as judge-made law can
be. Critics wishing to redirect this correct trend towards clarity
therefore cannot justify their wish on the basis that a need exists
for clearer law.
Thus, we must look for another explanation for the current
legislative initiatives by the critics on the subject of insider trad-
ing. In this section, I argue that the Supreme Court's
interpretation of rule 10b-5 posed some severe problems for special
interest groups, who stood to lose from the Court's interpretations.
From the SEC's perspective, the Court's decisions were prob-
lematic because they severely diminished the agency's power over
its most important constituency, the investment banking commu-
nity. It was the investment banks that benefitted most from the
Court's decisions.33 The agency responded to pressures from this
constituency by dramatically increasing its enforcement activi-
ties;34 however, by doing so, it suffered a loss of control over its
own agenda.
Meanwhile, Congress faced its own angered constituency. Spe-
cifically, by protecting property rights in information, the Supreme
Court's decisions on insider trading had enhanced the market cli-
mate for corporate takeovers. In turn, this pressured incumbent
management teams of large corporations by increasing the
probability that those teams would have to contend with hostile
takeovers. The managers wanted a set of rules that would elimi-
nate existing incentives for engaging in costly searches for poorly
managed or undervalued firms. From these groups erupted a nigh-
on hysterical demand for alteration of the Supreme Court's deci-
sions on the subject of insider trading.
As mentioned above, the SEC long had taken the position that
trading on the basis of material nonpublic information, regardless
insider trading prohibitions to permit treble damage recoveries, it declined to include a defi-
nition of insider trading on the theory that the existing substantive law was adequate.
Senator Alfonse D'Amato had proposed a draft bill containing a definition of insider
trading, but officials of the SEC, including John Shad (then-Chairman of the SEC), Daniel
J. Goelzer (General Counsel to the SEC), and John Fedders (then-Director of the SEC's
Enforcement Division), all testified against it. See Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1983:
Hearings on H.R. 559 Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 33·39 (1984).
33. See Haddock & Macey, Regulation on Demand, supra note 3, at 338-39.
34. Id. at 334.
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of the means by which the trader obtained such information, con-
stituted a violation of rule lOb-5. It is tempting to infer from this
that the SEC's policy on insider trading is driven by a well-inten-
tioned, albeit misguided, belief that securities traders should
compete on a completely level playing field. As Professor Michael
Dooley pointed out in his careful study of SEC enforcement activi-
ties against insiders, however, until the Court's decision in
Chiarella, the SEC rarely prosecuted anybody for violating the
rule against insider trading.35
What inferences can be drawn from the odd combination of an
incredibly broad conception of what constitutes illegal insider trad-
ing and an almost complete dearth of enforcement activity prior to
Chiarella? It seems that the SEC has adopted an expansive view
of the meaning of rule lOb-5 and the scope of insider liability in an
effort to enhance its own power. The agency has exercised this
power by agreeing to refrain from regulating insider trading in ex-
change for support from political supplicants.36
As David Haddock and I have observed elsewhere, the Court's
decision in Chiarella was an exogenous shock to this preexisting
political equilibrium.37 For the first time, at least one interested
group, market professionals, had an incentive to replace their re-
quest for regulatory forbearance with a demand for a greatly
enhanced enforcement effort. This incentive developed because the
Supreme Court for the first time made it clear that, while true in-
siders would be barred from trading on the basis of information
acquired in the course of their official duties, those who acquired
nonpublic information through the traditional financial investiga-
tions of investment bankers would not be subject to liability for
violating the rules against insider trading. Investment bankers and
other professional information processors began to demand greater
enforcement efforts by the SEC-and they got it.36
Meanwhile, however, the SEC's administrative control over
these supplicants has diminished since the law is now on their side.
The SEC would prefer a return to the days when the vagueness
35. Dooley, Enforcement of Insider Trading Restrictions, 66 VA. L. REV. 1,8-9 (1980).
36. For an excellent theoretical explanation of how regulators can extract political
support from forbearing to regulate, see McChesney, Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in
the Economic Theory of Regulation, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 101 (1987).
37. See Haddock & Macey, Regulation on Demand, supra note 3, at 327-30.
38. Id. at 332-33.
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and incoherence of insider trading law provided the agency with a
considerable source of power. Consistent with this explanation was
the SEC's prolonged and indefensible refusal to promulgate a defi-
nition of insider trading; to do so would provide clarity to the law
and consequently limit the SEC's power. To the extent that the
law remains vague, the SEC's services and regulatory forbearance
are in demand.
II. THE CURRENT LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL
Not surprisingly in light of this analysis, the definition the
SEC ultimately promulgated is a model of vagueness and obfusca-
tion. In fact, the SEC has taken the remarkable position that if a
definition of insider trading is to be enacted, it not only must be so
broad as to include all activities currently prohibited by case law,
but also must be flexible enough to apply to unspecified sorts of
investment activities that the SEC has yet to define.s9
It was not until the summer of 1987, after the enactment of a
statutory definition of insider trading had become a virtual cer-
tainty, that the SEC proposed legislation that would define the
crime of insider trading. Senators Donald Riegle and Alfonse
D'Amato made a specific request that the SEC assist their Securi-
ties Subcommittee in developing a universally acceptable
definition. Finally, on November 18, 1987, the SEC issued a press
release containing a proposed statute that it finds acceptable and
which it believes also will be acceptable to the Ad Hoc Legislative
Committee on Insider Trading, chaired by Harvey L. Pitt.·o
The SEC's Proposed Insider Trading BillU contains some sub-
tle, yet significant, differences from the current law as articulated
by the Supreme Court. These changes, if implemented, not only
would broaden the current scope of the law, but also would make
its applicability more vague than it currently is.
39. See H.R Doc. No. 355, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 25, reprinted in 1984 U.s. CODE CONGo
& Ant-UN. NEWS 2274, 2298 (Memorandum of the SEC in Support of the Insider Trading
Sanctions Act of 1984).
40. See Letter from David S. Ruder, Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission, to Donald W. Riegle, Chairman of the Securities Subcomm. of the Senate Comm.
on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, and Alfonse M. D'Amato, Ranking Minority Mem-
ber of the Securities Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs (Nov. 18, 1987) [hereinafter Ruder Letter].
41. See SEC Proposed Bill, supra note 10.
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For example, current case law makes it illegal to trade "on the
basis of" material nonpublic information. By contrast, the SEC's
proposed statute makes it illegal to trade "while in possession of"
such information.42 Under current law, in other words, defendants
may assert in their own defense that, while they may have been in
possession of inside information when they traded, their trades
were made on the basis of other factors besides this information.
This subtle change in language will make life much easier for
plaintiffs in insider trading cases, particularly where the defendant
has made a career of studying the company in whose shares he was
trading.
This change of language not only enhances the SEC's power,
but also is likely to make the securities markets less efficient.43 The
only people who are able to drive share prices to their correct
levels are those in possession of material information about a firm's
stock. By banning anyone possessing inside information from trad-
ing, regardless of the source of his motivation for trading, the SEC
would deprive the market of its principal source of rationality.44 To
the extent that the proposed statute seeks to establish a conclusive
presumption that possession, rather than use, of insider informa-
tion is illegal, it stands to do an enormous disservice to the capital
markets.
In one sense, the SEC's proposed statute ironically appears to
make things easier on defendant-tippees than current law. Under
current law, a tippee is liable if, inter alia, he "knows or should
have known" that the information he received was wrongfully ob-
tained. Under the SEC's proposed statute, however, the defendant
is liable only if he "knows or recklessly disregards" the fact that
the information was wrongfully obtained by the tipper.411 Under
42. Id. sec. 2, § 16A(b)(1).
43. The concept of market efficiency refers to the standard conception of the term as
used by financial economists. In this context, a capital market is said to be more or less
efficient depending on how quickly share prices in that market reflect information. The
more quickly share prices come to reflect information about underlying firms, the more effi·
cient the market is thought to be. Efficient markets serve as better guides of a society's
capital resources and, hence, are socially desirable.
44. See Carney, Signalling and Causation in Insider Trading, 36 CATH. U.L. REV 863,
877-85 (1987); Scholes, The Market for Securities: Substitution Versus Price Pressure and
the Effects of Information on Share Prices, J. Bus., Apr. 1972, at 179 (explaining that stock
price movements are driven by traders who possess new information about underlying se·
curities, not by buying and selling volume).
45. SEC Proposed Bill, supra note 10, sec. 2, § 16A(b)(1).
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the existing judge-made law, it is easier for plaintiffs to establish
the mental state ("scienter") necessary to obtain a conviction, be-
cause they need only meet an objective standard, i.e., they must
establish that a reasonable person in the same circumstances
would have realized that the information had been wrongfully ob-
tained. By contrast, under the SEC's proposal, it appears that a
plaintiff must establish that the individual defendant in the case
actually traded on nonpublic information after disregarding availa-
ble signals that the information had been wrongfully obtained. It is
a proposed shift from the objective to the subjective. This rule
change will be a benefit to market analysts and other market pro-
fessionals who acquire corporate information in the course of their
work and might be barred from trading under present law."6
The SEC's proposed statute also overrules a significant aspect
of the Supreme Court's opinion in Dirks on tipper-tippee liability.
In Dirks the Court held that tippees who obtained nonpublic infor-
mation from corporate fiduciaries would not be liable for trading
on the basis of that information unless the tippers obtained a "per-
sonal benefit" of some sort in exchange for releasing the
information to the tippees."'1 The statute proposed by the SEC
removes this personal benefit requirement, making it illegal to
communicate information that has been wrongfully obtained when
subsequent trading is "reasonably foreseeable."46
Again, this change from existing case law is likely to decrease
the efficiency of the capital markets. The personal benefit test,
though crude, did delineate liability and enabled the courts to dis-
tinguish certain cases, such as Dirks, in which insider trading
provided benefits to the capital markets, from those in which the
individual traders involved in the transactions were the only bene-
ficiaries of the trading.
The Dirks Court held that because Ronald Secrist, the defend-
ant's tipper, received no personal benefit from passing along the
inside information, Dirks was not subject to liability, regardless of
whether Secrist foresaw that Dirks would trade on the information
received. This conclusion benefitted the capital markets by provid-
46. For a theory of why the SEC might adjust insider trading law to benefit market
professionals, see Haddock & Macey, Regulation on Demand, supra note 3, at 319-24.
47. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 663 (1983); see also supra text accompnnying notes 23-
31.
48. SEC Proposed Bill, supra note 10, sec. 2, § 16A(c).
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ing analysts, such as Dirks, with incentives to ferret out all sorts of
socially useful information, including the financial fraud that
brought Equity Funding to its knees. Under the SEC's approach,
analysts are deprived of such incentives. In contrast to the Su-
preme Court's Dirks decision, if a tipper gives information to
tippees in order to benefit not himself, but his firm or his share-
holders (e.g., in the context of a takeover battle), he would be
subject to insider trading liability.
The SEC's proposed statute also overrules the famous case of
SEC v. Switzer,49 a case which caused the Commission considera-
ble embarrassment. In the case, Coach Barry Switzer, the
defendant, while a spectator at an University of Oklahoma track
meet, overheard a man, whom he knew to be a director of a pub-
licly held corporation, discuss with his wife the impending
liquidation of one of the corporation's subsidiaries. Switzer traded
on the basis of the overheard conversation and, subsequently, the
SEC brought suit. The United States District Court for the West-
ern District of Oklahoma, relying on Dirks, found that because the
director did not personally benefit from passing along the confi-
dential information, Switzer, as tippee, could not be held liable.GO
Had the SEC's proposal governed the outcome of the case, Coach
Switzer might have ended up in jail as a result of his trading activ-
ity. The proposal would require courts to determine whether the
tipper-in this case, the director-breached a duty to the corpora-
tion, and then whether the tippee-in this case,
Switzer-recklessly disregarded that the information had been
wrongfully obtained. Liability would hinge on affirmative findings
on both inquiries.
The SEC's proposal also marks a significant change from ex-
isting law in its description of the sort of contractual relationships
that constitute relationships of trust for the purpose of regulating
stock trading. Most significantly, the proposal makes it illegal for
one to trade on the basis of the "breach of any personal or other
relationship of trust and confidence, or breach of any contractual
or employment relationship"Gl and thus codifies the controversial
49. 590 F. Supp. 756 (W.D. Okla. 1984).
50. Switzer, 590 F. Supp. at 766.
51. SEC Proposed Bill, supra note 10, sec. 2, § 16A(c).
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misappropriation theory upon which the SEC based its recent
prosecution of R. Foster Winans in Carpenter v. United States/'2
In Carpenter, Mr. Winans, an employee of the Wall Street
Journal, was an author of a daily column published for securities
investors called "Heard on the Street." Despite the fact that the
Wall Street Journal considered the contents of the column to be
confidential, Winans entered into an agreement with brokers at the
investment firm of Kidder, Peabody under which he gave the bro-
kers advance warning regarding the timing and contents of his
column. The brokers made large trading profits by purchasing and
selling stock on the basis of the information.
Winans was indicted for violating section lOeb) of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934. The Court of Appeals ruled that
Winans fraudulently had misappropriated information from the
Wall Street Journal and that the misappropriation could support
a conviction under section lOeb) of the Act.G3 The Supreme Court
recently upheld the Court of Appeals holding, dividing equally on
the propriety of Winans's securities fraud conviction.M Considering
Chiarella and Dirks, a decision stating that a breach of fiduciary
duty can give rise to a prosecution for violation of the rules against
insider trading should not be surprising. The supposed wrinkle in
Carpenter, however, was that the actual trading did not occur in
the stocks of companies to whom the defendants owed a fiduciary
duty. Yet, in Chiarella the defendant did not purchase shares in
firms with whom he had a contractual or quasi-contractual
relationship.
In essence, then, the misappropriation theory adds nothing of
substance to the rules of insider trading developed in Chiarella
and Dirks. Rather, to the extent that it represents a change in the
law of insider trading, the theory affects the important procedural
question of standing, as opposed to any substantive issue. Specifi-
cally, the interesting question posed by the misappropriation
theory is whether purchasers and sellers of stock who traded at the
same time as Winans and his confederates have standing to sue for
violations of rule IOb-5. Here, the judge-made law indicates that
52. 108 S. Ct. 316 (1987), aff'g on securities fraud counts by an equally divided Court
791 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1986).
53. United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024, 1031·32 (2d Cir. 19&3).
54. Carpenter v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 316 (1987), aff'g on securities fraud counts
by an equally divided Court 791 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1986).
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the answer is "no"GG since, under the Supreme Court's theory of
the law of insider trading, liability flows from the breach of a fidu-
ciary duty by the defendant-trader (i.e., liability originates in the
trader's activities). An implication of this theory is that only those
market participants to whom the defendant owed a fiduciary duty
at the time of their trading have standing to bring suit.GO
The SEC's proposal attempts to alter this state of affairs. It .
grants standing to sue
in any court of competent jurisdiction to any person who, contempo-
raneously with the purchase or sale of securities that forms the basis
of such violation, has purchased (where such violation is based on a
sale of securities) or sold (where such violation is based on a
purchase of securities) securities of the same class.1I7
Thus, the proposal greatly expands the scope of defendant liability
by providing standing to sue to a whole class of plaintiffs to whom
no fiduciary duty was owed.
Aside from being devoid of any theoretical or practical justifi-
cation, the SEC's exceedingly expansive concept of standing in
insider trading cases undermines the basic theory of insider trad-
ing liability derived by the lower federal courts from the Supreme
Court's holdings in Chiarella and Dirks.G8 Again, it trades clarity
and accuracy for political prominence and confusion.
The expansive rule of standing proposed by the SEC would
produce bizarre results. Under the proposed law, the violation of
any express or implied intra-firm employment agreement would
give rise to a federal cause of action under the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 so long as securities trading somehow is involved in the
transaction. Additionally, not only may the SEC or the United
States Attorney General bring suit, but anybody involved in con-
temporaneous trading of the relevant securities is empowered to
bring suit, despite the fact that, in most cases, no fiduciary duty
was owed by the defendant to contemporaneous purchasers and
sellers.
55. See Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding that only
those traders to whom the defendants owed a fiduciary duty had standing to sue for viola-
tions of rule 1Ob-5), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1025 (1984).
56. Moss, 719 F.2d at 12; see also Macey, supra note 6, at 48-53 (discussing standing
under current insider trading law).
57. SEC Proposed Bill, supra note 10, sec. 2, § 16A(g)(1)(A).
58. See Macey, supra note 6, at 48-53.
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The statute also grants standing to "[a]ny person ... injured
by a violation of this section in connection with such person's
purchase or sale of securities."119 By expanding standing to
nonpurchasers, the SEC proposal overrules the 1975 Supreme
Court decision in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,60
which required that plaintiffs in insider trading cases be actual
purchasers or sellers of stock. There is no public interest justifica-
tion for this bizarre constellation of legal rules. It effectively allows
a host of unrelated parties with absolutely no stake in the matter
to bring suit. At the same time, the real party in interest, the em-
ployer, is empowered to translate a violation of a minor provision
in an intra-firm employment agreement into a federal cause of ac-
tion. It is anybody's guess how courts will grapple with the issue of
determining damages in such cases.
The SEC's proposed statute contains a number of exemptions
that are worth noting. First, brokerage firms that implement pro-
cedures deemed "reasonable under the circumstances" and
designed to prevent decisionmakers from possessing material non-
public information are exempted from liability.61 Because the SEC
ascertains whether the firms involved have taken these reasonable
steps, the proposed section will create a strong demand among the
brokerage community for the advice of the SEC about how their
firms should organize in order to avoid liability.
Additionally, by hiring a market professional who is not aware
of or influenced by the material nonpublic information, an insider
may exempt himself from liability.62 Needless to say, this provision
benefits the market professionals who comprise the SEC's natural
constituency.
Finally, lest there be any lingering doubt about the Commis-
sion's desire to use the legislative process to gather power for itself,
the proposal gives the Commission the power to exempt by rule or
by order "any person, security or transaction, or any class thereof,
from any or all of the provisions of this section."63 In essence, the
proposed statute is exceedingly complex, remarkably broad, and
shameless in its attempt to consolidate authority. By making mere
59. SEC Proposed Bill, supra note 10, sec. 2, § 16A(g)(1)(B).
60. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
61. SEC Proposed Bill, supra note 10, sec. 2, § 16A(b)(2)(B).
62. See id. § 16A(b)(2)(A).
63. [d. § 16A(O(1).
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possession of nonpublic information a crime in certain circum-
stances, the Act stands to restrict the flow of corporate information
that is vital to the efficient operation of the market.
The foregoing analysis suggests that the SEC stands to gain
not only by promulgating overly broad legal rules, but also by cre-
ating a sense of confusion among market participants. Indefinite
rules create a demand for the SEC's ability to engage in regulatory
forbearance.64 Similarly, creating confusion about the state of the
law fosters a demand for the SEC's administrative guidance. The
insider trading law the SEC has proposed is consistent with these
models of SEC behavior.
Thus far this essay has focused almost exclusively on the ef-
fects of the SEC's interest in the compromise proposal that it
generated. There is one substantive area in which the SEC was un-
able to find common ground with the views of the Senate's Ad Hoc
Committee: regulation of the market for corporate control under
the guise of insider trading law.
The SEC's compromise bill essentially codifies SEC rule 14e-
3.6G The SEC proposes to make it a crime for anyone to trade while
in possession of material nonpublic information relating to a
tender offer after "any person has taken a substantial step or steps
to commence, or has commenced, a tender offer" if the trader
knows or recklessly disregards that the information has been ac-
quired directly or indirectly from the offering person, the target, or
their agents.66 In addition to making trading on such information
illegal, the SEC also purports to make it illegal for offerors, targets,
or their agents to disclose information about an impending tender
offer.
In its proposed bill, labeled S. 1380,67 the Ad Hoc Committee
goes even further than the SEC to bar trading in takeover stocks
by those who enjoy an informational advantage. The bill seeks to
prevent
any person planning an acquisition or disposition of an issuer, a ma-
terial block of the issuer's securities or its assets, or any person
acting on behalf of such a person ... for the purpose of influencing
64. See Aranson, Gellhorn & Robinson, A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 Con-
NELL L. REV. I, 33-34 (1982).
65. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (1987).
66. SEC Proposed Bill, supra note 10, sec. 2, § 16A(d)(1).
67. S. 1380, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONGo REC. S8247 (daily ed. June 17, 1987).
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or encouraging the purchase or sale of the securities of such issuer,
to communicate, directly or indirectly, material, nonpublic informa-
tion concerning such plans to any other person who thereafter
purchases or sells the affected securities.68
The Ad Hoc Committee extends its definition of liability be-
yond that of the SEC by regulating communications pertaining to
transactions other than tender offers. The goal of both statutory
approaches is clear: it is to retard the operation of the market for
corporate control by impeding the ability of "corporate raiders" to
use nonpublic information about target firms in their quests for
the control.
Until recently, arbitrageurs and other market professionals
played an invaluable role in the market for corporate control by
amassing large blocks of shares in anticipation of a shift in corpo-
rate management following a tender offer. These arbitrageurs, of
course, ultimately profited by selling the shares to the tender of-
feror. But the arbitrageurs do not capture all of the gains in such
transactions. Shareholders of the firms that are targeted for the
tender offers also stand to profit by garnering a large capital gain
on the sale of their shares when they sell to the arbitrageurs.
By their purchases, arbitrageurs also reduce the bidders' ac-
quisition costs in several ways. First, arbitrageurs often have
specialized expertise in locating and ferreting out share blocks,
which is of incalculable value to bidders. Additionally, successful
purchases by arbitrageurs of the stock sought by bidders often re-
sult in favorable financing for the bidders. Finally, arbitrage
facilitates bidders' activities by enabling bidders to conceal their
identities and intentions until the final moments of the takeover
process.
The use of nonpublic information is critical to the takeover
process. Bidders who are forced to disclose their plans regarding
purchases of target firm stock will lose their incentive to engage in
the costly search necessary to uncover undervalued companies and
inefficient management teams. To the extent that bidders are de-
prived of the ability to keep their plans and information
confidential, there will be fewer corporate control transactions, and
68. Id. sec. 2, § 16A(c)(2).
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capital markets will be less efficient than they would be
otherwise.69
At present, the Williams Act70 forces bidders to disclose their
identity and plans upon launching a tender offer or within ten days
of acquiring five percent of another firm's stock via purchases that
do not constitute a tender offer. This requirement severely im-
pedes the proper operation of the market for corporate control.71
To the extent that bidders legally or otherwise could circumvent
the requirements of the Williams Act by taking advantage of the
services of arbitrageurs, shareholders, not to mention the economy
as a whole, were better off.
Those entrenched incumbent management teams of the corpo-
rations whose shares are likely targets for acquisition are the only
group harmed by the activities of arbitrageurs. Such management
teams stand to lose their jobs if their firms are taken over. Thus, to
the extent that incumbent management teams can mold them-
selves into an effective political coalition, they are likely to seek
restrictive legislation, despite the public benefits associated with
arbitrage activities.72
The legislation promulgated by the SEC and Congress reflects
the effectiveness of incumbent management as a political coalition.
Predictably, insiders have had more success influencing Congress
than they have had influencing the SEC. This is because the take-
over activities of such market professionals as arbitrageurs provide
direct economic benefits to the investment banks that constitute
the SEC's most loyal constituent group. Indeed, the benefits
granted to incumbent management that are seemingly contained in
the SEC's version of the statute may be illusory given that the
SEC has proposed to retain for itself broad authority to exempt
particular groups from the coverage of the Act. In contrast, the
perspective of incumbent management is well-represented in Con-
gress, since incumbent management teams are spread throughout
the country, while investment banks are concentrated on the
69. For fuller articulations of the economic underpinnings of this analysis, see Macey
& Netter, Regulation l3D and the Regulatory Process, 65 WASH. U.L.Q. 131 (1987); Fischel,
Efficient Capital Market Theory, The Market for Corporate Control, and the Regulation of
Cash Tender Offers, 57 TEx. L. REV. 1 (1978).
70. Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d).{e),
78n(dHO (1982 & Supp. I 1983».
71. See Fischel, supra note 69, at 9-18.
72. See Haddock & Macey, Regulation on Demand, supra note 3, at 314·17.
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coasts. Accordingly, in Congress investment banks are likely to be
at a distinct disadvantage vis-a.-vis the incumbent management
group. This disparity of political power will be felt most strongly in
the Senate, of course, since representation there is strictly geo-
graphic-but it will be felt in the House as well.
III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE CURRENT POLITICAL EQUILIDRIUM
To summarize, perhaps the most startling aspect of the SEC's
compromise statute is its incoherence. The incoherence should not
be surprising, since the SEC lacks a coherent theory for regulating
activities described in the statute. Most notably, the statute does
not provide a clear, cohesive theory for protecting those who are
harmed by insider trading. At one point, the statute invokes such
concepts as "misappropriation" and "conversion." The clear impli-
cation of this language is that insider trading is being proscribed
because it involves theft of a property interest (information) that
rightfully belongs to somebody other than the trader. But the fact
that those who purchase and sell stock contemporaneously with
the insider are given standing to bring suit indicates that the stat-
ute seeks to do something more than simply protect the property
interests of those rightfully in possession of nonpublic firm-specific
information.73 Similarly, the provisions in the statute that seek to
punish traders in possession of material nonpublic information, re-
gardless of whether their trades were consummated on the basis of
such information, cannot be reconciled with a property rights ap-
proach to the problem of insider trading.74
Indeed, the SEC's property rights justifications for the rules
against insider trading are inherently suspect. To be convincing,
73. On the other hand, the statute's treatment of trading in anticipation of tender
offers by those who enjoy an informational advantage appears to be more or less consistent
with a property rights/efficiency explanation of the legislation. As has been developed else-
where, a property rights analysis would allocate the rights to information about an
impending takeover to the firm or individual that initiates the transaction. See Macey,
supra note 6, at 28; Fischel, supra note 69, at 13-15. This is usually the tender offeror.
Consistent with this reality, the SEC's proposed insider trading law permits otrerors through
contractual arrangement or otherwise to empower other entities to purchase stock on behalf
of the offering person. SEC Proposed Bill, supra note 10, sec. 2, § 16A(d)(1). But, as dis-
cussed above, the rights afforded by one law may be restricted by another. The Williams Act
places severe restrictions on the ability of offerors to amass purchasing groups to acquire
stock on their behalf. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1982).
74. See SEC Proposed Bill, supra note 10, sec. 2, § 16A(b)(l).
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such justifications must explain why the control of insider trading
cannot be left to the plethora of private enforcement mechanisms
that are available to contracting parties. The SEC's proposal offers
no such explanation. Even more perplexing from a property rights
perspective is the question why those who enjoy a rightful owner-
ship interest in nonpublic information are forbidden by the statute
from selling the information.711 A statute outlawing such contracts
and forbidding the relevant parties from waiving the statute's pro-
visions in a consensual agreement cannot be defended on the basis
of a property rights theory.
It is also not possible to defend the proposed statute on the
grounds that it promotes a concept of "fairness" in the market-
place. The fairness justification for the laws barring insider trading
embody the thoroughly discredited concept that no trade should
be consummated unless both traders enjoy "parity of informa-
tion."76 Although this justification for insider trading regulation
long was embraced by the SEC, the Commission specifically re-
jected it when it issued its compromise regulation.77
Having rejected both the fairness and the property rights the-
ories as coherent explanations for the law, we are left with the
argument that the law is needed to protect the "integrity of the
nation's capital markets."78 This argument is hard to refute be-
cause nobody ever has bothered to explain what is meant by
capital market "integrity." Moreover, nobody ever has explained
why we should restrict the efficient allocation of property rights in
information in order to achieve such an ethereal goal.
One view of the concept of market integrity (often proffered
by the SEC when it lacks a coherent justification for its actions) is
that insider trading rilles are needed because investors will lose
confidence in the capital market unless they believe that they are
competing on a level playing field. At least four distinct arguments
refute this contention.
75. See Carlton & Fischel, supra note 2, at 861-72; Haddock & Macey, supra note 2, at
1452-56.
76. See Macey, supra note 6, at 14-17.
77. See Ruder Letter, supra note 40, at 4 ("The legislative history should state that
the bill is intended to reaffirm the existing law concerning 'market' information and 'corpo-
rate' information, and regarding what constitutes 'material nonpublic information,'
including the Supreme Court's disavowal in Chiarella ... that a 'parity of information'
theory is intended." (citation omitted».
78. See SEC Proposed Bill, supra note 10, sec. 2, § 16A(a)(1).
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First, the insider trading rules proffered by the SEC do not
attempt to establish a level playing field. Most obviously, tender
of{erors who have an unambiguous informational advantage over
their trading partners are free to purchase shares on the basis of
their advantage within the limits prescribed by the Williams Act.
Perhaps more importantly, when insiders are barred from
trading, a level playing field is not created because one group of
market professionals, often called quasi-insiders, still has an ad-
vantage over all other traders. These market professionals "devote
their careers to acquiring information and honing evaluative skills"
about a firm, an industry, or a group of firms or industries.79 Even
though true insiders are barred from trading by the SEC's propo-
sal, these market professionals, who owe no legal or fiduciary duty
to refrain from trading on the basis of their lawfully acquired in-
formational advantage, are permitted, indeed encouraged, to
trade.so It is this group of market professionals, rather than the
trading public, that benefits from the general proscription on in-
sider trading. A level playing field does not exist.
Stated another way, the level playing field vision of the mar-
ket integrity argument rests on the bizarre premise that if insiders
are barred from trading, the resulting gains will be spread ran-
domly throughout the economy. This premise is absurd. The
competition to capture profits based on information not currently
reflected in a firm's share price is one that is won by the swiftest.
The swiftest invariably turn out to be the cadre of market profes-
sionals who have devoted their lifetimes to acquiring, decoding,
and acting upon the corporate information upon which trading
profits are based. If insider trading is banned, the playing field
does not automatically become level; it simply tilts in a different
direction.
A second reason why the market integrity argument cannot be
maintained is based on the fact that traders do not believe that the
market represents a level playing field anyway. Traders can be di-
vided into two distinct groups. One group consists of investors who
do not harbor the illusion that they can garner returns on their
investments that are greater than those earned by a market index.
•79. Gilson & Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. 1.. REv. 549,
571 (1984); see Haddock & Macey, Regulation on Demand, supra note 3, at 318.
80. See Haddock & Macey, Regulation on Demand, supra note 3, at 318.
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These investors typically own a diversified portfolio of securities
and adopt a buy-and-hold strategy. Such investors are immune to
the effects of insider trading of any sort because they purchase
shares when insiders are purchasing just as often as they purchase
shares when insiders are selling. Consequently, such investors are
indifferent to whether insider trading is taking place.81 In contrast,
some investors, the market professionals, can garner profits by
strategic (i.e., nondiversified) trading. As David Haddock and I
have argued elsewhere, it is these investors who prefer that insid-
ers be banned. They do not want the playing field level, but want
to make it irregular by tilting it in their favor.82 Of course, there
may be some traders who are not market professionals who believe
that they can beat the market (i.e., beat the market professionals)
if insiders are barred from trading. The efficient capital market hy-
pothesis has shown this investment strategy to be extremely
dubious. In any case, such investors do not want a level playing
field any more than the market professionals do. Rather, they want
the insiders removed from the comp.etition so that they will have a
greater advantage over those whom they believe are less well-
informed.
The third response to the level playing field argument was for-
mulated by Professor Ken Scott of Stanford Law School. He has
observed that, so long as the possibility of insider trading is known
to all traders, outsiders cannot be disadvantaged because the price
the outsiders pay for their shares will be reduced by the amount
necessary to compensate them for any excess risk they assume in
purchasing the shares.83 In other words, the stock price absorbs the
risk. As Dennis Carlton and Dan Fischel have pointed out, this is
virtually "a complete response to the claim that investors are ex-
ploited by insider trading."84
Finally, the best response to the market integrity argument
rests in the fact that the securities markets of several countries in
which capital formation techniques have reached very high levels
of sophistication and in which secondary trading markets provide
81. To the extent that insider trading by manager8 lowers the demand of such manag-
ers for fixed salaries from their firms, shareholders will prefer that insiders be permitted to
engage in such trading. See Haddock & Macey, supra note 2, at 1454, 1463-64.
82. Haddock & Macey, Regulation on Demand, supra note 3, at 330·32.
83. Scott, supra note 1, at 808-09.
84. Carlton & Fischel, supra note 2, at 881.
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investors with great liquidity do not enforce bans on insider trad-
ing regulation at alJ.8li Of particular interest in this regard is the
complete lack of enforcement of the laws that are on the books in
Japan and the absence of laws affecting the Hong Kong Stock Ex-
change. In Japan, the Tokyo Stock Exchange is rougWy the same
size as the New York Stock Exchange. Trading on the Tokyo Ex-
change is higWy automated, and investors enjoy unparalleled
liquidity for their shares. In recent years, corporate stock traded
on the Tokyo exchange has traded at a far higher price-to-earnings
ratio than corporate stock traded on the New York Stock Ex-
change. In other words, there is absolutely no evidence of any crisis
of confidence in the Japanese capital markets despite the fact that
"[t]he Japanese stock market is an insider's paradise. There is no
clear rule of law prohibiting insider trading and no public record of
efforts to prevent the practice."8S
Similarly, in Hong Kong, the regulation promulgated in 1974
to control insider trading was repealed without any discernible ef-
fects on that robust marketplace.87 Indeed, the recent trend
towards insider trading regulation in Common Market countries
appears to be due largely to pressure from the United States.S8
CONCLUSION
In summary, the SEC's regulation of insider trading cannot be
justified on the grounds that it promotes the goals of efficiency,
fairness, or market integrity. This exhausts the public interest ra-
tionales for the proffered regulation. Instead, the regulation offered
reflects a hodgepodge of special interest concerns. It thus is no sur-
prise that the proposed statute appears needlessly complex and
lacks any coherent theoretical framework.
It seems that the best explanation for the statute is that it
reflects the unrelated private concerns of three powerful special in-
85. See Haddock & Macey, Controlling Insider Trading, supra note 3, at 149-51.
86. Repeta, Declining Public Ownership of Japanese Industry: A Case of Regulatory
Failure? 17 L. JAPAN 153, 184 (1984); see also Carlton & Fischel, supra note 2, at 860 n.16
("In Japan ... insider trading is considered proper, and there has never been a reported
case under the limited insider trading prohibition currently in effect.") (quoting B. RJDER &
H. FRENCH, THE REGULATION OF INSIDER TRADING (1979».
87. Carlton & Fischel, supra DOte 2, at 860 n.16 (citing B. RIDER & H. FRENCH, supra
DOte 86).
88. See Haddock & Macey, Controlling Insider Trading, supra DOte 3, at 150.
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terest groups. The SEC itself is interested in keeping the law as
vague as possible in order to maximize the demand for its own ser-
vices as an administrative agency. The recent enthusiasm in
Congress for increasing the budget of the SEC in an era of fiscal
belt-tightening reflects the SEC's success in this regard. Most of
the publicity and concomitant increases in congressional support
for the SEC's activities come from the Commission's investigations
of insider trading activity.B9
In addition to the SEC, the community of investment bankers
and related market professionals who stand to gain if true insiders
are barred from trading, are a major source of demand for the new
statute. Securities professionals and their lawyers have spent mil-
lions of dollars lobbying for a statute that deals with insider
trading. It is impossible to imagine that those professionals have
provided this sort of support for a statute that does not favor their
interests.
The final group that stands to gain from the new statute is the
incumbent management teams of companies that are likely to con-
front hostile takeover bids. By supplementing the existing
provisions of the Williams Act and related rules, the SEC's pro-
posed statute further impedes the operation of arbitrageurs, who
facilitate corporate control contests.
The point of this essay has not been to suggest that it is im-
possible to come up with an internally coherent set of rules to
regulate insiders' trading activities. In fact, I have made it clear
that the Supreme Court moved quite decidedly in this direction in
its enormously valuable decisions in Chiarella and Dirks.ao Al-
though the law promulgated in these cases was by no means
perfect, contrasting that law with the SEC's new proposed statute
reveals that the SEC's proposal is an inferior product from the
perspective of serving the interests of the American public. As
usual, the special interests have triumphed in the legislative
process.
89. Of particular note, of course, is the publicity surrounding the recent prosecutions
of Dennis Levine and Ivan Boesky.
90. See supra text accompanying notes 14-31 (discussing Chiarella and Dirks).
